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Abstract—Cognitive radio has emerged as an essential recipe
for future high-capacity high-coverage multi-tier hierarchical net-
works. Securing data transmission in these networks is of utmost
importance. In this paper, we consider the cognitive wiretap
channel and propose multiple antennas to secure the transmission
at the physical layer, where the eavesdropper overhears the trans-
mission from the secondary transmitter to the secondary receiver.
The secondary receiver and the eavesdropper are equipped with
multiple antennas, and passive eavesdropping is considered where
the channel state information of the eavesdropper’s channel is not
available at the secondary transmitter. We present new closed-
form expressions for the exact and asymptotic secrecy outage
probability. Our results reveal the impact of the primary network
on the secondary network in the presence of a multi-antenna
wiretap channel.
Index Terms—Cognitive radio, multiple antennas, physical
layer security, wiretap channel.
I. INTRODUCTION
Future multi-tier heterogeneous networks have become
more and more vulnerable to serious security attacks and
security threats of eavesdropping. Due to the distributed nature
of the broadcasting channel, security concerns are further
escalated to the forefront and have taken on an increasingly
important role in spectrum sharing networks. In underlay
cognitive spectrum sharing networks, the primary network and
the secondary network are allowed to transmit concurrently
in the same spectrum [1, 2]. In such complex environments,
securing and protecting the broadcast channel against eaves-
dropping is arguably a more challenging task. In addition, due
to the dynamic nature of these environments, higher layer
cryptographic authentication and identification have become
expensive and vulnerable to attacks [3, 4].
In light of the aforementioned circumstances, there has
been intense interest in physical layer security to secure
data transmission without the need for complex cryptographic
operations. Physical layer security is also a solution to support
and supplement existing cryptographic protocols [5]. The
fundamental principle is to strengthen the main channel of
the legitimate receiver relative to the eavesdropper’s chan-
nel for achieving perfect secrecy. Triggered by the rapid
advances in multi-antenna techniques for 4G and beyond,
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security enhancement in wiretap channels with multiple an-
tennas has attracted widespread attention (e.g., [6–10] and the
citations therein), where the transmitter, the receiver, and/or the
eavesdropper are equipped with multiple antennas. Previous
work in [6] considered the single-input multi-output (SIMO)
wiretap channel and derived the secrecy outage probability
with maximal ratio combing (MRC) at both the legitimate
receiver and the eavesdropper. An extension of [6] to the
practical scenario of multiple eavesdroppers was presented
in [7]. Transmit antenna selection for security enhancement
was introduced in [8, 9] as a low complexity cost-effective
approach. More recently in [10], the secrecy outage probability
was evaluated in the presence of an untrusted relay.
In particular, cognitive radio is envisioned as a promising
technique to alleviate the scarcity of radio frequency spec-
trum, which is the most important radio resource of wireless
networks. This can be done by allowing the unlicensed user
to occupy the spectrum without causing harmful interference
on the licensed user. Security is an important requirement
for future 5G systems, and cognitive radio is no exception.
Particularly, security of cognitive radio networks is critical as
it is easily exposed to external threats [11–17]. The robust
transmitter design via optimization for secure cognitive radio
networks with and without perfect channel state information
(CSI) was addressed in [11] and [12], respectively. In [13],
security for the main channel was guaranteed by performing
beamforming from a group of relays. In [14], relay selection
was proposed for security constrained cognitive radio with a
single eavesdropper. The proposed scheme selects a trusted
relay to maximize the achievable secrecy rate subject to
interference power constraints at the primary user (PU) under
available channel knowledge. In [15], secure communications
with untrusted secondary users in cognitive radio networks was
proposed and the achievable secrecy rate was derived. In [16,
17], game theory was utilized to exploit the security aspect
of cognitive radio networks. While the aforementioned laid a
solid foundation to understand the role of physical layer secu-
rity in cognitive radio networks, the impact of multi-antenna
wiretap channels on cognitive spectrum sharing networks for
passive eavesdropping is less well understood. In contrast to
the aforementioned scenarios, we consider the passive eaves-
dropping scenario, where knowledge of the eavesdropper’s
channel is not known at the secondary transmitter. In such a
scenario, perfect secrecy cannot be achieved, and as such the
secrecy outage probability is an important performance metric
used for system evaluation.
In this paper, we take into account the cognitive wiretap
channel and determine the necessary conditions to secure the
confidential message against eavesdropping. Passive eaves-
dropping is considered, where the channel state information
of the eavesdropper’s channel is not available at the secondary
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Fig. 1. A cognitive wiretap radio network.
transmitter. In such a cognitive wiretap channel, the secondary
transmitter sends confidential messages to the secondary re-
ceiver in the presence of a eavesdropper. With this in mind,
the secondary receiver is equipped with multiple antennas
to promote secure data transmission without the need for
a secret key or code. The eavesdropper is equipped with
multiple antennas to promote successful eavesdropping. In
this network, the interference power at the PU from the
secondary transmitter must not exceed a peak interference
power threshold. Our aim is to address fundamental questions
surrounding the joint impact of two power constraints on the
cognitive wiretap channel: 1) the maximum transmit power at
the secondary transmitter, and 2) the peak interference power
at PU. To address these constraints, we derive new closed-
form expressions for the exact and asymptotic secrecy outage
probability. Our expressions reveal important design insights
into the impact of the primary network on the secondary
network in cognitive wiretap radio networks.
II. SYSTEM AND CHANNEL MODELS
Consider a cognitive wiretap radio network, where the
secondary transmitter Alice (A) communicates with the sec-
ondary receiver Bob (B) under the malicious attempt of
the eavesdropper Eve (E) as shown in Fig. 1. We assume
a cognitive network with underlay spectrum sharing which
allows concurrent transmissions from PU and A in the same
spectrum band. For this network, A transmits data to B, where
B and E are equipped with multiple antennas nB and nE,
respectively, whereas A and PU are equipped with a single
antenna.
Both the primary channel and the secondary channel are
assumed to undergo independent identically distributed (i.i.d.)
Rayleigh fading, where the channel gains fh1ignBi=1, fh2jgnEj=1,
and h0 are complex Gaussian random variables (RVs) with
zero mean and variances 
1, 
2, and 
0, respectively. We
also assume that the main channel from A to B and the
eavesdropper’s channel from A to E are independent of each
other. We consider antenna selection1 at B and E2. Here, B
and E select their strongest receive antennas based on perfect
CSI estimation via pilot signals transmitted by A. Based on
this, the instantaneous signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) in the main
and the eavesdropper’s channel are given by
M = max
i=1;:::;nB
PA
N0
jh1ij2; E = max
j=1;:::;nE
PA
N0
jh2j j2; (1)
respectively, where PA is the transmit power at A and N0 is
the noise variance.
According to underlay cognitive radio transmission, the
transmit power at A must be managed under a peak inter-
ference power threshold to guarantee reliable communication
at PU. With this in mind, A is power-limited such that the
maximum transmit power is Pt. As such, the transmit power
at A is strictly constrained by the maximum transmit power
Pt at A and the peak interference power Ip at PU according
to
PA = min

Ip
jh0j2 ;Pt

; (2)
from which the instantaneous SNR at Bob and Eve in (1) are
reexpressed as
M = min

p
X
; 0

YM ; E = min

p
X
; 0

YE ; (3)
respectively, where p = Ip=N0, 0 = Pt=N0, X = jh0j2,
YM = max
i=1;:::;nB
jh1ij2, and YE = max
j=1;:::;nE
jh2j j2.
III. SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY
We focus on passive eavesdropping, where knowledge of
the eavesdropper’s channel is not known at A. In such a
scenario, A has no choice but to encode the confidential
data into codewords of a constant rate Rs [19]. Following
the wiretap channel in [19, 20], A encodes a message block
W k into a codeword Xn, and the eavesdropper receives
Y nw from the output of its channel. The equivocation rate
of Eve is Re = H
 
W k
Y nw  =n. We assume slow block
fading for the main channel and the eavesdropper’s channel,
where the fading coefficients are constant during a codeword
transmission. Taking this into account, we define the secrecy
rate as [19]
Cs =
(
CM   CE if M > E
0 if M  E ; (4)
where CM = log2 (1 + M) is the capacity of the main channel
and CE = log2 (1 + E) is the capacity of the eavesdropper’s
channel. The secrecy rate Cs in (4) is the maximum achievable
perfect secrecy rate R such that Re = R [19, 20]. In passive
eavesdropping, if Rs  Cs, perfect secrecy is guaranteed.
Otherwise, if Rs > Cs, information-theoretic security is
1It is well-known that using antenna selection can achieve the full diversity
gain with a less number of RF electronics for each branch compared to
maximal ratio combining [18].
2In commercial wireless applications, the eavesdropper may be subject to
the same resource constraints as the legitimate receiver. Specifically, it may
be limited to a single radio frequency (RF) chain due to size and complexity
limitations, as was considered in [7] and [9].
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compromised. As such, the secrecy outage probability is the
probability that Cs falls below Rs
Pout =Pr (Cs < Rs) = Pr (M  E)
+ Pr (M > E)| {z }
A
Pr (Cs < RsjM > E)| {z }
I
: (5)
In order to evaluate the term I, we first rewrite Cs in (4) as
Cs = log2

1 + M
1 + E

< Rs; (6)
which is equivalent to
M < 2
Rs (1 + E)  1 = (E): (7)
Then I can be written as
I = 1A
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
Z (E)
E
fMjfX=xg (M) fEjfX=xg (E)
 fX (x) dMdEdx: (8)
where fX (x) is the PDF of X , fAjfX=xg () is the PDF of A
conditioned on X , A 2 fM; Eg. By exchanging the variable
in the limits of inner integral I, we obtain
I = I1   I2A ; (9)
where I1 and I2 are respectively given as
I1 =
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
Z (E)
0
fMjfX=xg (M) fEjfX=xg (E) fX (x) dMdEdx (10)
and
I2 = 1 A: (11)
Putting together (5), (9), (10), and (11), we get
Pout =
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
FMjfX=xg ((E)) fEjfX=xg (E)
fX (x) dEdx: (12)
where FMjfX=xg () is the CDF of M conditioned on X .
For ease of exposition and mathematical tractability, we
denote 1 = 0
1 =
p
1
 and 2=0
2 =
p
2
 with
 =
Ip
Pt
. Here, 1 represents the maximum possible average
SNR of the channel between A and B, and 2 represents the
maximum possible average SNR of the channel between A
and E.
A. Exact Secrecy Outage Probability
In this subsection, we present a novel closed-form expres-
sion for the exact secrecy outage probability, as given in the
following theorem.
Theorem 1: The exact secrecy outage probability of the
proposed cognitive multi-antenna wiretap channel is given by
(13) at the top of the next page,
Proof: See Appendix A.
It is worth noting that (13) involves only finite summa-
tions of exponentials, powers, and exponential integral func-
tions, thus can be calculated in closed-form. This expression
serves as a prerequisite for other secrecy metrics such as
the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity, calculated as
Pr (Cs > 0) = Pr (M > E) = 1   Pout (0). In addition,
considering the special case of a single antenna transmitter
and a single antenna receiver, our secrecy outage probability
expression without interference power constraint reduces to [7,
eq. (11)]. Our secrecy outage probability expression without
interference power constraint also reduces to [9, eq. 34] with
a single transit antenna in Rayleigh fading.
B. Asymptotic Secrecy Outage Probability
We derive a new asymptotic expression for the secrecy
outage probability at high SNR operating regions. The main
driver is to identify the key players that control network
behavior. The aim is to determine the impact of PU on A in the
presence of a multi-antenna wiretap channel. In particular, we
are interested in the joint impact of the maximum transmit
power Pt at A and the peak interference power Ip at PU
on the secrecy outage probability. Other key network players
of interest are the number of antennas nB at B and the
number of antennas nE at E. With this in mind, we address
the interference power constraint of Ip proportional to Pt
according to Ip = Pt, where  is a positive constant. Based
on Appendix A, we first obtain the first order expansion of
FMjfXg () conditioned on X as
FMjfXg () =
8<:


1
nB
; X  p0
X
1

nB
; X >
p
0
; (14)
Substituting (14) and fEjfX=xg (E) and fX (x) into (12),
and using the binomial expansion, the asymptotic secrecy
outage probability is calculated as
P1out =

1  e 
p
0
0
 nBX
i=0

nB
i

2Rs   1
1
nB i2Rs
1
i
nE 1X
j=0

nE   1
j

nE
2
( 1)j
Z 1
0
(E)
i
e 
(j+1)E
2 dE
+
nBX
i=0

nB
i

2Rs   1
1
nB i 2Rs
1
i nE 1X
j=0

nE   1
j

nE
2
( 1)j 1

0
Z 1
p
0
e 
x

0
Z 1
0
xnB+1 (E)
i
e 
(j+1)E
2
xdEdx
(15)
Employing [21, eq. (3.351.3)] given by
R1
0
xne xdx =
 (n+1)
n+1 , we can evaluate the integrals in (15) and derive the
secrecy outage probability as
P1out = (Ga1)
 Gd +O

 Gd1

; (16)
where the secrecy diversity order is
Gd = nB (17)
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Pout =

1  e  
0
 nBX
i=0

nB
i
 nE 1X
j=0

nE   1
j

nE
2
( 1)i+je 
i(2Rs 1)
1

i2Rs
1
+
j + 1
2

+
nBX
i=0

nB
i
 nE 1X
j=0

nE   1
j

nE
2
( 1)i+j 1

0

i2Rs
1
+
j + 1
2
 1
e 


0
  i(2
Rs 1)
1
1

0
+ i(2
Rs 1)
1
; (13)
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Fig. 2. Secrecy outage probability with 2 = 10 dB and nE = 2.
and the secrecy array gain is
Ga =
"
1  e  
0
 nBX
i=0

nB
i
 
2Rs   1nB i 2Rsi
nE 1X
j=0

nE   1
j

nE2
i( 1)j   (i+ 1)
(j + 1)
i+1
+
nBX
i=0

nB
i

 
2Rs   1nB i  nB2Rsi nE 1X
j=0

nE   1
j

nE (2)
i
( 1)j(
0)nB i   (i+ 1)
(j + 1)
i+1
 

nB   i; 

0
#  1nB
; (18)
where   (; ) is the incomplete gamma function [21, eq.
(8.350.2)].
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
Numerical examples are provided to highlight the impact of
the primary network on the secondary network in the presence
of a multi-antenna wiretap channel. The exact and asymptotic
curves are obtained from (13) and (16), respectively. The
exact curves are in precise agreement with the Monte Carlo
simulations. We also see that the asymptotic curves well
approximate the exact curves at high SNR. The asymptotic
curves accurately predict the secrecy diversity order and the
secrecy array gain. Throughout this section, we assume unity
variance 
0 = 1 and expected secrecy rate Rs = 0:1 bit/s/Hz.
Fig. 2 plots the secrecy outage probability versus 1 for
different  and different nB. According to (17), we see that
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Fig. 3. Secrecy outage probability with  = 0:1 and nB = 4.
the secrecy diversity order increases with nB, which in turn
decreases the secrecy outage probability. We also see that the
secrecy outage probability decreases with . This is due to
relaxing the peak interference power constraint Ip = Pt,
which in turn increases transmit power PA, as indicated by
(2). This can also be explained by the fact that the secrecy
array gain in (18) increases with increasing .
Fig. 3 plots the secrecy outage probability versus 1 for
different 2 and different nE. The parallel slopes of the asymp-
totes confirm that the secrecy diversity order is independent
of 2 and nE, as indicated in (17). Note the secrecy outage
probability increases with increasing 2 and nE. This confirms
that the secrecy array gain in (18) is a decreasing function of
2 and nE.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We proposed physical layer security enhancement in cogni-
tive multi-antenna wiretap channels. In an effort to assess the
secrecy performance in passive eavesdropping, we adopt the
secrecy outage probability as a useful performance measure.
We derived new closed-form expressions for the exact and
asymptotic secrecy outage probability. Based on these, we
revealed important design insights into the interplay between
two power constraints, namely the maximum transmit power
at the secondary network and the peak interference power at
the primary network. The impact of these constraints on the
cognitive wiretap channel was showcased.
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APPENDIX A: PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We first provide the CDF and PDF of Y = max
n=1;:::;N
Yn,
where Yn is i.i.d. exponential RV with parameter 
Y , which
can be written as
FY (y) =
NX
n=0

N
n

( 1)ne  ny
Y (19)
and
fY (y) =
N 1X
n=0

N   1
n

N

Y
( 1)ne 
(n+1)y

Y : (20)
In addition, fX (x) = 1
0 e
  x
0 .
Based on (3), we note that when X  p0 , M =
0YM ; E = 0YE , and when X >
p
0
, M =
p
X YM ; E =
p
X YE . Hence, the secrecy outage probability in (12) can be
calculated as
Pout =Z p
0
0
Z 1
0
FMjfX=xg ((E)) fEjfX=xg (E) fX (x) dEdx| {z }
J1
+
Z 1
p
0
Z 1
0
FMjfX=xg ((E)) fEjfX=xg (E) fX (x) dEdx| {z }
J2
:
(21)
Based on (19), for X  p0 , we have
FMjfX=xg ((E)) =
nBX
i=0

nB
i

( 1)ie 
i(E)
0
1 ;
fEjfX=xg (E) =
nE 1X
j=0

nE   1
j

nE
0
2
( 1)je 
(j+1)E
0
2 :
(22)
By substituting (22) into J1 of (21), J1 can be derived as
J1 =
Z p
0
0
fX (x) dx
nBX
i=0

nB
i
 nE 1X
j=0

nE   1
j

nE
0
2
( 1)i+j

Z 1
0
e 
i(E)
0
1
  (j+1)E0
2 dE
=

1  e 
p
0
0
 nBX
i=0

nB
i
 nE 1X
j=0

nE   1
j

nE
0
2
( 1)i+j
 e 
i(2Rs 1)
0
1

i2Rs
0
1
+
j + 1
0
2

: (23)
For X > p0 , we have
FMjfX=xg ((E)) =
nBX
i=0

nB
i

( 1)ie 
i(E)
p
1
x
;
fEjfX=xg (E) =
nE 1X
j=0

nE   1
j

nE
p
2
( 1)jxe 
(j+1)E
p
2
x
:
(24)
By substituting (24) into J2 of (21), J2 can be derived as
J2 =
nBX
i=0

nB
i
 nE 1X
j=0

nE   1
j

nE
p
2
( 1)i+j 1

0Z 1
p
0
e 
x

0
Z 1
0
xe
  i(E)p
1 x 
(j+1)E
p
2
x
dEdx
=
nBX
i=0

nB
i
 nE 1X
j=0

nE   1
j

nE
p
2
( 1)i+j 1

0Z 1
p
0
xe 
x

0 e
  i(2
Rs 1)
p
1
x
Z 1
0
e
  i2RsxEp
1  
(j+1)E
p
2
x
dEdx
=
nBX
i=0

nB
i
 nE 1X
j=0

nE   1
j

nE
p
2
( 1)i+j 1

0


i2Rs
p
1
+
j + 1
p
2
 1
e 
p
0
0
  i(2
Rs 1)
0
1
1

0
+ i(2
Rs 1)
p
1
: (25)
Substituting (23) and (25) into (21), we get the desired result
(13).
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